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Abstract 
The Median Voter Theorem is a key concept in political economy, one that has been 
tested numerous times in the literature. However, it remains unclear the extent to which 
legislators respond to the needs of their district on a bill-by-bill basis. This paper seeks to 
understand the role of ideology and of local economic pressures that a state legislator 
faces when deciding how to vote on minimum wage legislation. Although some papers 
have examined legislator voting behavior on specific issues, this paper uses state 
legislatures and minimum wage bills to innovate on this existing literature in two key 
ways. First, I capitalize on the fact that the content of minimum wage legislation is 
relatively consistent throughout time, thus expanding my sample size and allowing me to 
compare bills across several years and states. Second, results from minimum wage bills at 
the state level are more generalizable, as they address important issues but are less high-
profile than most federal or emergency bills. To test this question, I compile a list of state 
minimum wage bills that received a floor vote between 2012-2016 and of each 
legislators’ vote. I then match each legislator with an ideology score from the “The 
Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures,” and a series of economic and 
demographic variables from the American Community Survey at the district level. I find 
that minimum wages are an overwhelmingly partisan issue, with Democrats being almost 
60 percent more likely to vote in favor of an increase. However, as the number of 
individuals in a district who would be affected by a minimum wage increase goes up, 
legislators become less likely to vote in favor of the bill. 
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1. Introduction 
In his 1956 book Profiles in Courage, President John F. Kennedy muses on the 
pressures that representatives face when they cast their vote. He notes that legislators 
ought to pay special attention to representing the interests of their constituents, for “who 
will speak for Massachusetts if her own Senators do not?” (Kennedy 2016). Kennedy cuts 
to the heart of a key question in political economy: to what extent do legislators actually 
represent the interests of their constituents—as opposed to that of lobbyists or their own 
conscience—when they vote? While legislators must be somewhat representative of their 
voters by virtue of winning election, since voters will not select candidates dramatically 
away from their ideal points, it is unclear whether this translates precisely into votes on 
specific bills. Will a legislator with a large construction industry in her district vote in 
favor of subsidies to the industry? If there is conflict between ideology and constituent 
interests, which force will win out?  
Theoretically, the Median Voter Theorem (MVT) provides some clarity on this 
issue, hypothesizing that politicians will campaign and vote in accordance with the 
preferences of the median voter in their district, thus suggesting that constituent interests 
would influence specific voting behavior (Downs 1957). However, the evidence for this 
theory is mixed. While some papers find that legislators do consider the economic and 
political preferences of their constituents (Mian, Suffi, and Trebbi (2010); Kousser et al. 
(2007)), others find that a legislator’s personal ideology is by far the most important part 
of their considerations (Levitt (1996); Fowler and Hall (2016); Clinton (2005); Bouton et 
al. (2014); Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2018)). However, Mian, Suffi, and Trebbi (2010) 
 2 
and Fowler and Hall (2016) are among the only prominent papers to examine legislative 
voting behavior on specific issues. The validity of the MVT as it applies to voting 
behavior on a bill-by-bill basis therefore remains a question open for exploration. While 
legislators could respond to the median voter in the aggregate, they potentially have 
greater flexibility on individual bills to move towards their own ideal points.  
 In the following paper, I will examine the determinants of legislator voting 
behavior in the context of state legislators voting for minimum wage bills in the period 
from 2012-2016. I will focus on state legislatures (as opposed to federal representatives) 
and on minimum wage bills for several key reasons. First, the content of minimum wage 
bills is relatively consistent throughout time and across states, allowing me to pool bills 
and capitalize on a larger sample size. Additionally, while raising the minimum wage has 
become an important topic in recent years and there is a very clear group of people 
affected by this legislation, most beneficiaries are not obviously well-organized or 
involved in politics at the state level which could change the legislators’ incentives. A 
good amount of the existing literature research focuses on votes on high-profile bills, yet 
these bills constitute a very small amount of the actual bills that legislators vote on, 
drawing into question the external validity of this research. State minimum wage votes 
address a relevant topic, but state legislators rarely face the same level of scrutiny as 
federal representatives thus making these votes more broadly applicable to a legislator’s 
day-to-day decision making.   
The data for this paper comes from several different sources. First, I compile a 
database of bills that would raise a state’s minimum wage, and which received at least 
one floor vote in either chamber. To measure a state legislator’s ideology, I use data from 
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“The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures,” which assigned scores to 
legislators based on their past voting behavior and responses to a survey. Finally, I 
measure the economic incidence of a minimum wage bill using data from the American 
Community Survey to determine the approximate proportion of constituents that would 
be affected by a change in the minimum wage at the level of each state legislative district.  
I find that while economic incidence and ideology are not statistically significant, 
political party is extremely important in predicting voting patterns, suggesting that the 
minimum wage has become a steadfast part of Democratic party platform to the point that 
intra-party differences on this issue are very small. Democrats are over 60 percent more 
likely to vote in favor of an increase to the minimum wage than Republicans and 
Independents, and legislators from districts with a high proportion of individuals who 
traditionally support Democrats (nonwhite constituents and college educated 
constituents) are also more likely to vote in favor of the bill. Notably, even though 
economic incidence is not statistically significant, it is noteworthy that the coefficient is 
negative, suggesting that as economic incidence increases, the likelihood of a legislator 
voting in favor of a bill decreases. Whether this is due to skepticism from those who 
would benefit or action by their employers requires further work to untangle. 
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2. Background 
The extent to which legislators respond to pressures from their constituents as 
opposed to their own ideological interests is a key question in political economy. 
Consider a group of individuals running for political office. Each individual will 
independently and simultaneously choose their campaign platform, which they are 
expected to abide by if they win. How do candidates initially choose their platform? The 
Median Voter Theorem (MVT) hypothesizes that if all candidates care about is winning, 
their platforms will converge so that they all reflect the median constituent’s interests, as 
this will maximize their chances of winning (Downs 1957). In a more complex version of 
this model, candidates face two competing pressures. On one hand, when a candidate 
wins, they will receive some additional utility, which denotes the benefits of office. On 
the other hand, each candidate has a preferred ideological point that they would like to 
see enacted into law. If candidates are utility maximizing, they will try to balance their 
desire to win the election with the disutility of voting for policies they disagree with.  
The MVT is a controversial idea, as there appears to be a great deal of ideological 
heterogeneity amongst candidates and politicians even from the same district.1 Thus, a 
large literature discusses the merits of this theorem, analyzing why districts observe 
variance in politicians’ ideology. However, this is not an easy theorem to test, as 
constituent interests tend to be highly correlated with their legislator’s ideology. 
Essentially, a legislator from a given district will be elected because her ideology aligns 
with the needs and desires of the constituents; while it may not perfectly reflect the 
median, voters generally act in accordance with their perceived self-interests or the best 
 
1 Consider, for example, a state that elects U.S. Senators from different parties.  
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interests of their district.2  Thus, it is important to understand how much of a legislator’s 
decision-making is driven by constituent interests independent of the correlation between 
the legislator’s preferences and her district’s preferences. One of the first papers to 
adequately control for ideology in trying to separate the pressures that legislators face 
when choosing how to vote on a bill is Levitt (1996), which controlled for senator and 
constituent ideology on several roll call votes. Levitt measured senator ideology using the 
legislator’s individual scores from Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) while 
constituent ideology was measured by taking the mean score of the senator’s respective 
congressional delegation. Levitt found that voter preferences explained less than a quarter 
of the legislator’s decision, while the legislator’s ideology was overwhelmingly 
important, thus providing evidence against the MVT. Since the publication of this article, 
a robust literature has emerged using different measures of legislator ideology and 
looking at whether these results hold for different types of bills.  
A significant portion of the literature concurs with Levitt’s conclusions; that is, 
the MVT does not describe why legislators vote in a particular way. Fowler and Hall 
(2016) modified Levitt’s approach by looking at constituents’ economic interests as 
opposed to their ideological preferences, examining a series of votes on eight different 
subject areas, and found the same results. Clinton (2005), Bouton et al. (2014), and 
Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2018) all came to similar conclusions—legislators do not 
respond to their constituency evenly. All of these articles, except for Bouton et al. (2014) 
which examines a specific bill on gun legislation, look at a long period of roll call votes 
 
2 Although, of course, the constituents in a given district can be manipulated through gerrymandering, etc. 
voters still choose those that they believe will represent their interests the best.  
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to determine voting behavior. In these cases, it is difficult to pinpoint constituents’ 
economic interests (as opposed to their broad political preferences). This approach can be 
useful for ensuring that one’s results are not idiosyncratic to a specific bill or period in 
time, but it can also mask the effect that constituents could have on voting behavior.  
Several papers do find, however, that constituencies matter even after controlling 
for ideology. When constituencies change, either when a legislator moves from the House 
to the Senate or when the 17th Amendment to the Constitution was passed, elected 
officials change their voting behavior so that it better reflects their new constituency’s 
ideology and interests (Miler 2015 and Gailmard and Jenkins 2009). Legislators also 
appear to be perceptive to changes in a fixed constituency’s interests; for example, 
Kousser et al. (2007) found that politicians adapt their voting behavior when confronted 
with sudden and evident ideological shifts in the public, such as in California in 2003 
when Governor Gray Davis, a Democrat, was recalled and replaced with Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, a Republican.  Mian, Suffi, and Trebbi (2010) was a particularly 
important paper in providing evidence for the assertion that constituent interests do 
matter, although the subject of the bill affects the extent to which they matter in 
comparison to ideology. Specifically, the authors examined how ideology, campaign 
contributions, and economic pressures from a member of the United States House of 
Representatives’ district influenced a representatives’ voting behavior. They examined 
two key recession-era bills: the American Housing Rescue and Foreclosure Prevention 
Act (AHRFPA) and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA). They found that 
politicians were much more responsive to constituent interests on the AHRFPA, but 
special interest contributions tended to be more highly weighted when a representative 
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was considering a vote in favor of the EESA. It is possible that politicians assumed the 
taxpayer would pay less attention to a vote on corporate bailouts but would be more 
attuned to legislation that determined whether they were able to keep their homes. Thus, 
it would be logical to weigh constituent interests more heavily when voting on AHRFPA 
than the EESA. Despite this finding, it is important to note that ideology was still the 
most important determinant of voting behavior. Additionally, AHRFPA and EESA were 
highly visible bills intended to mitigate the effects of one of the worst economic crises in 
American history, drawing into question the external validity of their findings. While it is 
important to understand how politicians vote under extreme pressure, their study may not 
elucidate standard behavior.  
Minimum wage legislation presents an opportunity to measure representatives’ 
responsiveness to constituent economic interests when there is not an immediate crisis 
that draws concentrated attention from the electorate. Essentially, it is a meaningful, but 
ordinary, piece of legislation. Additionally, minimum wage legislation is a recurring topic 
allowing for larger sample sizes since bills of a similar nature have been proposed many 
times in recent history. The political economy literature has explored minimum wage 
bills by asking two main questions: why are minimum wages set at a certain level and 
why do politicians vote a certain way on that legislation? Neumark and Wascher (2008) 
provide an overview of the literature surrounding this first question, discussing the 
importance of unions and the presence of low-wage workers, the political popularity of 
minimum wage legislation, and the role of various interest groups in lobbying for higher 
or lower minimum wages. As such, I primarily focus on the literature relating to the 
second question. 
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Silberman and Durden (1976) were among the earliest to test for the effect of 
constituent interests on politician’s voting behavior on federal minimum wage legislation. 
They examined the prevalence of different groups that would be affected by an increased 
wag and found that constituent interests were influential (particularly the strength of 
unions, number of small businesses, and the number of low wage workers). However, 
they did not control for ideology which potentially biases their results. Kau and Rubin 
(1978) and Blais et al. (1989) remedied this default and found that ideology was one of 
the most important factors in a federal representative’s decision. Waltman and Pittman 
(2002) estimate the determinants of variation in minimum wage laws between states. 
While they are only study of state minimum wages to include party control of state 
government and ideology, they do not examine the voting behavior of individual 
legislators.  
This paper expands the current literature by focusing on state legislatures and 
using ideology and economic incidence measures at the district level. As noted earlier, 
minimum wage legislation is relatively consistent; hundreds of bills proposing an 
increase in the minimum wage have been introduced in recent years and dozens have 
been the subject of floor votes. This allows me to expand my sample size beyond a single 
chamber or bill, as was the case in Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2010), and have greater 
variation in incidence across local labor markets . Additionally, I will use updated 
ideology scores “Measuring American Legislatures.” These data generate an ideology 
score for each legislator, thus allowing me to analyze the voting behavior of state 
legislators from 1993-2016 on specific roll call votes. Studying the impact of ideology 
and party is particularly noteworthy during a political era defined by concerns that 
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partisanship and polarization are overriding the needs of citizens; it is possible that 
legislators at the federal level have become even less responsive the median voter, while 
the same is not necessarily true for state legislators. Finally, I use data at the level of the 
state legislative district for economic incidence which, to the best of my knowledge, has 
never been done before.  
Beyond the technical differences between my paper and the past literature, I will 
also explore two deeper concerns about the MVT and legislator voting behavior. First, 
while the MVT could prove to be true over the long run and throughout several bills, it is 
unclear whether legislators are sensitive to the needs of their constituents on a bill-by-bill 
basis. Simply, it remains unclear whether a defined set of constituent interests on a single 
issue could motivate legislators to deviate from their own ideological ideal points so long 
as they remain close to the median on average. Second, high visibility bills make it much 
more difficult for legislators to deviate from the median than is the case for ordinary 
legislation. Federal bills are, on average, higher visibility than state bills. Additionally, 
bills that are dealing with crises or issues of obvious relevance will demand greater public 
accountability. While state minimum wage bills are relevant, they are considerably less 
pressing and less publicized allowing me to probe more deeply at the effect of the median 
voter on “ordinary yet consequential” legislation.  
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3. Data 
My analysis focuses on the determinants of legislators’ vote choice on state bills 
to raise the state minimum wage. The analysis includes bills from 16 states and covers 
votes in both the state upper and lower chamber between 2012 and 2016. I utilize three 
main data sources: roll call votes on the bills of interests, data on the incidence of the 
minimum wage legislation, and data on legislator ideology. The data on votes comes 
from the National Conference of State Legislature’s Minimum Wage Legislation 
Database and searches on LexisNexis State Net. I use both of these resources to identify 
bills or constitutional amendments that would raise the minimum wage or index it for 
inflation. The Minimum Wage Legislation Database contains bills that were proposed in 
2015 or later, while State Net is used to identify earlier bills.3 I further restrict my search 
to bills that received at least one floor vote in either chamber. I do so as committee votes 
are not as well publicized as floor votes and only represent the voting behavior of a 
subset of legislators. Additionally, many bills that are introduced never even receive a 
committee vote and would thus make it impossible to extract any information about a 
legislator’s preferences. However, this means that the list of bills might be open to 
selection issues, as many introduced bills will never receive a floor vote for ideological or 
economic reasons. Thus, committees could provide a mechanism for undermining the 
control of the median voter—while voters might hold a legislator responsible for their 
floor vote, committees can ensure that legislators will not have to choose between 
party/ideology and constituent interests. This means that although this study can offer an 
 
3 Due to restrictions from the Measuring American Legislatures data set (which will be further discussed 
later), the most recent bills that could be used in this analysis were voted on in 2016.   
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explanation of floor voting behavior, further research ought to look at the impact that the 
median voter has on this selection process.  
I initially compiled a list of 88 bills; however, 38 dealt with more specialized 
subjects such as increasing subminimum wages or expanding the number of 
people/positions that qualified for subminimum wages, increasing minimum wages for 
specific groups (e.g., home health workers), creating commissions to study the effects of 
a minimum wage increase, and authorizing a ballot proposition to increase the minimum 
wage.4 Since these bills would not have a standard economic incidence across legislative 
districts, they are excluded from this analysis. Several additional bills are excluded as 
their voting record was not accessible, as was the case in four Hawaii bills and one 
Vermont bill. This is primarily because the vote was taken solely via voice vote and a 
written roll call of the votes was not recorded to the best of my knowledge.  
For each of the remaining bills, I compile the name of each legislator, their 
chamber, their state, the bill in question, and how they voted. I create an indicator 
variable for vote equal to 1 if the legislator voted in favor of raising the minimum wage 
and 0 if the legislator voted against it.5 Abstentions and absences are recorded as missing 
and are ultimately excluded from my analysis; however, only about 3% of the total votes 
are abstentions.6 Some bills received multiple votes in chambers, namely when a bill was 
sent back to its original chamber for concurrence or when a bill was vetoed; therefore, I 
create an indicator variable noting whether the vote in question was the primary floor 
 
4 A subminimum wage is a legal exemption to the minimum wage that includes tipped employees (who are 
allowed lower wages because they receive additional money from tips that should approximately equal the 
minimum wage) and individuals with disabilities. 
5 Note that all these bills proposed an increase in the minimum wage, and none proposed to lower it. 
6 This assumes that abstention is not strategic, but orthogonal to the legislator’s calculations of self-interest.  
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vote, a concurrence, or a veto override. These were labeled “Type 1,” “Type 2,” and 
“Type 3,” respectively. Such multiple votes are each entered into the dataset and included 
in my general analysis, but I also conduct a robustness check limiting the data to only the 
first vote on a bill (see Appendix tables A1 and A2 for a complete list of bills and other 
vote information). Additionally, I create an indicator variable for whether the bill was 
signed into law by the governor and noted how much each bill proposed to increase the 
minimum wage. These data restrictions led to a sample of 42 bills from 20 different states 
with 6,201 different individual votes.  
 
Data on legislator ideology comes from Measuring American Legislatures 
Individual State Legislator Shor-McCarty Ideology Data (Shor and McCarty 2011). I use 
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an update released in May 2018, which contains data from 1993 to 2016. The Shor-
McCarty Ideology Data contains information on each legislator in that time period, 
including their party, a list of each year they served in office, and their district. Most 
importantly, the authors compiled an ideology score for each legislator using roll call data 
and responses to the National Political Awareness Test (NPAT), a survey conducted by 
Project Vote Smart that asked yes or no questions to legislators about policy issues (Shor 
and McCarty 2011). Negative scores on this measure indicate liberal ideology and 
positive scores indicate conservative ideology. These data are ideal for my purposes 
because they are the only known source of state legislator ideology that are consistent 
across states and have been updated recently. Note that some bills in my initial dataset 
had to be excluded from my analysis as the Shor-McCarty Ideology dataset did not 
include ideology data for the relevant years in Kentucky, Massachusetts, and the 
Minnesota Senate. Data from the Minnesota House is available, however, and those votes 
are included.7 After dropping these states, I am left with an N of 5,344 individual vote 
data points on 36 bills.  
Finally, I use individual responses from the 5-year estimates of the American 
Community Survey for each Public Use Microdata Area, or PUMA (Ruggles et al. 2020), 
to calculate the economic incidence that an increase in the minimum wage would have on 
a given legislative district. It is also the source of district demographics serving as control 
variables. While the one-year estimates available are a more accurate snapshot of a 
 
7 The 2014 release of Measuring American Legislatures do contain 2013 and 2014 data for the 
Massachusetts house. However, legislative districts in the Massachusetts and New Hampshire house are not 
standardized and there is no available crosswalk between Public Use Microdata Area, which is used to 
calculate economic incidence, and these districts. Therefore, bills from Massachusetts and New Hampshire 
are excluded from my analysis 
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district in a given year, the sample size is significantly smaller as fewer districts are 
represented and the data are prone to short-term fluctuations rather than illustrating 
broader economic trends. Thus, I chose to use the 5-year estimates for my analysis. I 
define economic incidence as the percentage of the labor force in each district that would 
be directly affected by a minimum wage increase because their current wages are beneath 
the proposed floor. This variable definition is discussed in more detail below. To estimate 
hourly wages, I divide annual income by the estimated number of hours worked per week 
and the estimated number of weeks worked per year.  
 
(1)    ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦	𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 = !"#$%!	'()*+"
,*-$.	/"$	0""1∗0""1.	0*$1"3	/"$	!"#$
 
 
These data are ideal for the purposes of this thesis as the survey covers approximately 
two million people each year with much more precise geographic data than any other 
national survey with data stretching from 2012 to 2016. Next, I use geographic 
correspondence data from the Missouri Census Data Center’s Geographic 
Correspondence Engine (Geocorr) 2018 to translate PUMAs to state legislative districts.  
Based on hourly wage, I create the economic incidence variable that uses the 
upper bound of a proposed change to calculate the percent of the labor force in each 
district that would be affected by the bill. The upper bound of a proposed change is 
defined as the maximum increase in the minimum wage, regardless of the time horizon. 
For example, California Senate Bill 3 increased the minimum wage from $10 in 2016 to 
$15 an hour by 2023. In my dataset, anyone making under $15 an hour would be 
considered to be influenced by the minimum wage, even though not everyone in this 
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sample would immediately benefit. Two bills, one in New Mexico and one in North 
Dakota, only indexed the minimum wage for inflation. For these bills, I calculate the 
projection inflation rate seven years into the future, where seven years represents the 
longest time-horizon from my sample.8 The predicted inflation rate is calculated using 7-
year Treasury Inflation-Indexed Securities and 7-year Treasury Constant Maturity rates. 
This method allows me to see how much legislators would have thought they were voting 
to increase the minimum wage at the time of the vote. I calculate an additional measure 
of economic incidence, which includes the previous measure and everyone who has an 
hourly wage below the current minimum wage. Income reports on surveys are 
consistently subject to error and respondents who report below minimum wages might 
simply be misreporting their income. Thus, I also examined this second measure of 
economic incidence (anyone making below the proposed minimum wage) in order to see 
if this measurement error might be affecting my results. 
I additionally include nine control variables from the ACS in order to isolate the 
effect of the number of people in a given district that would be directly affected by an 
increase in the minimum wage. Including these controls is particularly important, as they 
can all affect the reason that citizens of a district might prefer a minimum wage. For 
example, areas with high unemployment would likely be hurt by an increase in the 
minimum wage while areas with a higher median wage would be less affected by an 
increase in the minimum wage, potentially allowing legislators to vote more in line with 
their ideology. Alternatively, rural districts in the United States tend to be ideologically 
 
8 California Senate Bill 3 
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conservative; thus, while a minimum wage increase could help citizens, they might be 
ideologically opposed.  
These data could be prone to collinearity in the control variables as, for example, 
some demographic information will likely be correlated with income and the economic 
incidence or ideology might be correlated with the level of urbanity in a district. 
However, as Table A3 in the appendix illustrates, most of these variables were only 
weakly correlated, except for ideology and party.  
Finally, I weight the economic incidence and the control variables from the ACS, 
using the sampling weights for the ACS data to scale the proportion of each group to be 
more reflective of the demographics of the United States and ensure that my final results 
are not skewed by the survey’s sampling. I also weight the data by the proportion of each 
PUMA in a district. For example, if one-third of PUMA is in a given district, that 
PUMA’s economic incidence will be weighted as 33% of the district’s actual economic 
incidence. Unfortunately, despite the broad coverage of the ACS, not all state legislative 
districts were sampled. When no one from a given district participated in the ACS, 
economic incidence is coded as missing and the legislator is excluded from my analysis, 
reducing N to 3,161. Given the ACS’s sampling procedure, it is likely that this selection 
is orthogonal to the economic incidence of minimum wage legislation and will not bias 
my results. However, several districts had a very small number of survey participants 
such that the economic incidence was 100% or 0%. This will introduce heteroskedasticity 
in the standard errors, as districts with fewer people will have larger standard errors. To 
account for this discrepancy, I use clustered standard errors in my final analysis, which 
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will be discussed more in-depth in the next chapter. Table A4 in the Appendix illustrates 
how many districts were retained in the sample for each state.  
A. Summary Statistics 
 Table 1 presents summary statistics. Districts tend to have relatively low rates of 
economic incidence; by my calculations, an increase in the minimum wage would only 
directly affect around 4% of the labor force of the average district. This number appears 
to be consistent with other findings about the incidence of minimum wage. A 2019 report 
found that only around 3% of the labor force would see their earnings increase if the 
federal minimum wage was increased to $10 per hour, and around 10% would be affected 
if the federal minimum wage increased to $15 per hour (CBO 2019). Most bills included 
in my analysis fall within this range, suggesting that this is a reasonable calculation of 
economic incidence. 
My control variables are also relatively close to the national averages, although 
the median wage is slightly higher, and the sample is slightly less educated. According to 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the median hourly wage for all occupations was 
approximately $18 per hour in 2018, while the nation high school completion rate was 
84% (Kerr and Boyington 2019).  
After examining the kernel density plots of each of these variables, I noted that 
many of these variables are right-skewed, particularly incidence, unemployment, and the 
demographic variables.   
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Table 1: 5-Year ACS Summary Statistics: State Legislative Districts Within Sample 
  Mean S.D. P.10 P.50 P.90 Skewness 
Vote 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 -0.60 
Ideology Score -0.40 1.03 -1.57 -0.68 1.11 0.42 
Economic Incidence (5 year) 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.11 9.23 
Economic Incidence including Subminimum  
Wage (5 year) 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.17 5.79 
Democrat 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 -0.48 
% Unemployed (5 year) 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.08 10.92 
% Not in Labor Force (5 year) 0.35 0.19 0.23 0.34 0.42 1.80 
% Black (5 year) 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.22 3.36 
% Hispanic (5 year) 0.13 0.18 0.00 0.07 0.36 2.43 
% Asian (5 year) 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.14 6.58 
% of district that is rural (5 year) 0.24 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.21 
% of district with a college degree (5 year) 0.26 0.19 0.08 0.22 0.42 2.03 
% of district with only a high school degree 0.51 0.20 0.36 0.53 0.62 -0.25 
Median Wage of district (5 year) 19.89 7.17 14.90 18.41 28.74 1.90 
Observations 3161      
 
B. Summary Statistics by Vote 
Table 2 compares the means of the variables of interest for the districts whose 
representatives voted “no” and representatives who voted “yes.” Districts whose 
representatives vote in favor of the bill are, on average, much more liberal ideologically 
and are predominantly Democrats. They also tend to be slightly more racially diverse and 
slightly less rural, although they are almost identical in incidence, unemployment, and 
percent not in the labor force.   
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Table 2: Mean by Vote, State Legislative Districts Within Sample 
  "Yes" "No"  
Ideology Score -0.81 0.34 
Democrat 0.85 0.20 
Economic Incidence (5 year) 0.04 0.04 
Economic incidence plus lower (5 year) 0.10 0.10 
% Unemployed (5 year) 0.05 0.05 
% Not in Labor Force (5 year) 0.35 0.34 
% Black (5 year) 0.12 0.07 
% Hispanic (5 year) 0.14 0.12 
% Asian (5 year) 0.05 0.04 
% of district that is rural (5 year) 0.23 0.28 
% of district with a college degree (5 year) 0.27 0.26 
% of district with only a high school degree 0.50 0.52 
Median Wage of district (5 year) 19.63 20.34 
Observations 1981 1092 
 
 
The majority of the sample, close to two-thirds, voted in favor of increasing the 
minimum wage; this is likely skewed by the fact that all of these bills had to make it out 
of committee, suggesting that the legislature allowed floor votes when they were likely to 
pass. Although not every bill was signed into law, table A2 in the appendix reveals that a 
majority of these bills did pass in the chamber where they were introduced. 
Figure 2 looks at these data slightly more carefully. It contains a series of 
histograms for each of these variables, separated by vote.9 The density plots appear to be 
very similar for legislators that voted yes and no, again with the exception of ideology.  
 
9 The histograms for economic incidence, the expanded measure of economic incidence, and 
unemployment were all trimmed at 0.5, as there were no data past this point with the exception of a few 
outliers at 1. These outliers were due to very small samples from the ACS.  
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Figure 2: Histogram of Variables by Vote
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4. Empirical Strategy 
 To assess the causal relationship between a legislator’s vote on minimum wage 
bills, their ideology, and the economic impact the bill would have on their district, I 
utilize a probit model and employ a linear probability model as a robustness check. 
Consider an individual legislator’s utility 𝑈'4 where i represents the individual legislator 
and j represents the bill under consideration. Building on Mian et al.’s (2010) equation 
for the utility of a legislature, I consider their utility function as follows: 
(2)         𝑈'4 = 𝜃𝑓1𝑣'43 + 𝑔1𝑣'43 + 𝜀'45  
where f maps the vote onto their ideological preferences, g maps the vote onto the 
likelihood of reelection and 𝜀'5 is the random preference component. I use 𝑣'4 to denote 
the legislator’s vote on the relevant bill, where 1 is a vote in favor of the minimum wage 
bill and 0 is a vote against. In both possible models, legislators are aiming to maximize 
their utility such that the probability of voting yes on a bill is as follows: 
(3)    Pr1𝑣'4 = 13 = Pr((−𝜃𝐼𝐷') + 𝛽61𝐶𝐼'43 > 𝜀'7 − 𝜀'6) 
where 𝐼𝐷' is a legislator’s ideology score, generated by the Shor-McCarty Ideology 
dataset, and 𝐶𝐼'4 is constituent interests, measured by the economic incidence of the bill 
in question. The model is as follows: 
(4)   𝑃𝑅(𝑣' = 1) = 𝛽7 + 𝛽6(𝐼𝐷') + 𝛽8(𝐶𝐼') + 𝛽9(𝑃') + 𝐹𝐸4 + 𝛽:𝑋 + 𝜀' 
where ideology is 𝐼𝐷', constituent interests are 𝐶𝐼', party is 𝑃', and 𝐹𝐸4 are bill fixed 
effects. X is a vector of relevant control variables, including a district’s employment rate, 
median income, racial composition, and an indicator variable of whether the district is in 
a rural or urban area. 	𝜀 is an error term with the usual properties. All other variables are 
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as previously defined. I will present both models to ensure that the results are consistent, 
along with the marginal effects of the probit model. 
A challenge with these data is that the same legislator will likely appear multiple 
times, either in a concurrence vote or another minimum wage bill that came to the floor 
while they were in office. These votes are likely correlated and I thus cluster my standard 
errors around the bill. Clustered standard errors will mitigate the possibility of 
heteroskedasticity and the standard errors being too large or too small. Due to the 
possibility of small clusters, I additionally test robust standard errors in order to maintain 
valid inference.  
I also examine education levels in a district as a proxy for the economic 
incidence. Personal income, and thus hourly wage, is highly correlated with education 
(Lemieux 2006), theoretically causing a district with a relatively low percentage of 
college-educated workers or a high number of people without a college degree to benefit 
more from an increase in the minimum wage.  
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5. Results 
In this section, I estimate equation (4) to examine the determinants of state 
legislator voting behavior on minimum wage bills, as well as several robustness checks.  
Subsection A presents my general findings, with Table 23displaying results for the first 
measure of economic incidence (those who make strictly between the minimum wage and 
the proposed change) and Table 4 presenting the results when incidence is defined as 
anyone who makes less than the proposed change. Subsection B investigates what 
happens when I restrict the sample to Type 1 votes, or the first vote that the bill receives 
in each chamber, and Subsection C examines the differences in voting behavior for 
Democrats and Republicans in my sample. All the tables in this section use clustered 
standard errors, as this is the more rigorous test of significance. However, as I noted in 
the data section, I am concerned about small clusters and repeated the same specifications 
using robust standard errors. The corresponding table to each specification in the 
following three subsections is included in the Appendix.  
A. General Findings 
Several patterns emerge from the results in Table 3. First, economic incidence is 
not statistically significant even before controlling for ideology or party. Additionally, 
although the sign of economic incidence is initially in the anticipated direction— as the 
number of people in a district that would be affected by a minimum wage increase, a 
legislator is more likely to vote for the bill—the sign switches as soon as I control for 
party. This effect persists for every following specification. These findings suggest that a 
large economic incidence makes a legislator less likely to vote for the bill. One possible 
explanation is that districts with a large number of minimum wage workers also have a 
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large number of minimum wage employers who might be better organized to exert 
pressure on legislators. Another is that legislators are very concerned about the potential 
unemployment effect of minimum wage increases and the harm that effect could have on 
their constituents. Future studies ought to look further into this issue, possibly by 
examining special interest contributions.  
Second, ideology is not statistically significant after controlling for party 
suggesting that there are very few intra-party differences. Minimum wages appear to 
have become a strictly partisan issue. Thus, I drop the ideology scores from my 
specifications as party seems to explain all of this variation. Finally, most of the controls 
are not statistically significant. After I controlled for all of the variables of interest in 
columns 10-12  columns of Table 3, I combined the three demographic variables (Black, 
Asian, Hispanic) into a single variable, “Percent Nonwhite,” and began eliminating 
insignificant variables. 
 In my final specification in columns 13-15, I regress economic incidence, party, 
percent nonwhite, and percent of the district with a college degree on the final vote. The 
probit and linear probability model yielded very similar results; thus, for ease of 
interpretation, I will discuss only the results of the linear probability model. While 
economic incidence remained insignificant, the sign remained negative suggesting that a 
one-percentage point increase in the proportion of the district who would be affected by 
the proposed change is associated with a 13 percent decrease in the likelihood that a 
legislator will vote for it. Although education and percent non-white were not statistically 
significant, the direction of the coefficients does propose an interesting story as a 
legislator from a more highly educated district was more likely to vote in favor of the bill, 
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all else constant. This is in the opposite of what I might initially expected, as highly 
educated districts would likely be less reliant on minimum wages. The result is consistent 
with the finding that incidence is negatively related with a yes vote, however.  
I also find that party is highly significant even at the one-percent level and 
Democrats were 62.3 percent more likely to vote for minimum wage increases than 
Republicans. Finally, legislators from districts with a larger proportion of non-white 
constituents were more likely to vote in favor of a minimum wage bill, with a one-
percentage point increase associated with 10.7 percent increase in the likelihood of voting 
for the bill. Notably, racial minorities and college educated voters tend to vote for 
Democrats at a far higher rate than other groups, which lends support to the theory that 
this issue is primarily partisan.  
As a robustness check, I examined a slightly different measure of economic 
incidence. While the above results were only for those making strictly between the 
current minimum wage and the proposed increase, Table 3 looks at anyone making below 
the proposed increase, even those who stated that they had an hourly rate below 
minimum wage. This could happen for two reasons. First, the individual receives a 
subminimum wage, possibly because of a disability, an exemption, or they are a tipped 
worker who did not quite make minimum wage. Second, the ACS data is based on survey 
responses and are subject to human error; if someone misreports the number of hours that 
they worked or their yearly income, they might erroneously appear to fall slightly below 
the threshold in the data. 
Even with this more robust measure of economic incidence, the results are 
extremely consistent—economic incidence was still negative while party, race, and 
 26 
college education were all positively associated with the probability of a legislator voting 
in favor of a bill. Party remained the only significant result.10 
  
 
10 Since the expanded measure of incidence was almost identical to the narrower version, I will only be 
presenting results from this point forward that use the narrow definition.  
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B. Restricted to First Vote 
In addition to my general specification, I also restricted the sample to just “Type 1” 
votes, or the first vote from each chamber that a bill received. Doing so eliminated the 
possibility of “double counting” legislators who were voting the same way on very 
similar bills. This decreased the sample size to an N of 2,483. The direction of the signs 
on all the variables in the final specification remains the same, and party remains 
statistically significant at the one percent level although the magnitude decreases 
somewhat. Notably, however, percent nonwhite and economic incidence become 
statistically significant when I restrict the sample, suggesting that the results may have 
been somewhat biased by a group of legislators who were effectively counted more than 
once but were not very responsive to economic incidence. Economic incidence remained 
negatively associated with a legislator’s final vote.  
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C. Differences in Voting Behavior for Democrats and Republicans 
Table 6: Crosstabulation of Party and Vote 
 No Yes 
Republican 1,422  621 
Democrat 315  2,625 
Total 1737 6,246 
  
While party was overwhelmingly the most important factor in a legislator’s decision-
making process, Table 6 reveals that there were some legislators that crossed party lines. 
What drove this variation within parties? Figure 3 reveals that Democrats and 
Republicans appear to have relative opposite motivations— the Republicans who voted 
against an increase had a higher average incidence while Democrats who voted against 
the bill had lower average incidence.  
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Figure 3: Incidence by Party and Vote
Republican Democrat
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To investigate this matter further, I ran the same regressions as the first two 
subsections while restricting Table 7 to just Democrats and Table 8 to just Republicans to 
see where this intra-party variation came from. Nine bills are excluded for Democrats and 
fourteen bills are excluded for Republicans, as there was no intra-party variation (for 
example, all Democrats voted in favor or all Republicans voted against). These bills may 
represent outliers based on certain bill characteristics, such as a more disciplined state 
party or an amendment that is particularly egregious to one party or another. Because of 
these exclusions, it is even more likely that I have too few bills for clustered standard 
errors. Although I present them below for the sake of consistency, Tables A8 and A9 in 
the appendix contain the robust standard errors. Unlike the previous two sections, I also 
control for ideology throughout all my specifications, as ideology may be a motivate 
legislators to switch votes within parties.  
Among Democrats, incidence and ideology are both statistically significant using 
both robust and clustered standard errors. An increase in economic incidence is still 
negatively associated with voting in favor of the bill, with a one-percentage point 
increase in economic incidence associated with a 22 percent increase in the likelihood of 
voting for the bill. More liberal legislators are also more likely to vote in favor of the bill; 
notably however, incidence actually outweighs the effect of ideology. 
The same trend holds true for Republicans—more liberal Republicans are more 
likely to vote in favor a minimum wage increase and those with a higher level of 
incidence vote against it. Incidence is not significant using clustered standard errors, but 
it is using robust standard errors. Ideology is significant using both types of standard 
errors.  
 33 
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6. Conclusion   
What factors influence a legislator’s decision to vote in favor of a bill? Do they 
care more about their personal ideology, the economic interests of their constituents, or 
their political party? These questions lie at the heart of the median voter theorem, a key 
principle in political economy that has been questioned by papers such as Levitt (1996) 
and Mian, Suffi, and Trebbi (2010). At least at the federal level, past research has 
revealed that legislators appear to care more about their personal ideology than the 
preferences of their constituents. However, less attention has been paid to the subject of 
state legislators’ voting behavior. State minimum wage bills provide a unique opportunity 
to study voting behavior, as minimum wage bills are relatively consistent throughout time 
and across states thus increasing the possible sample size. Additionally, minimum wage 
bills affect a clear portion of the labor force, but those that benefit tend to be poorly 
organized.  
I find that, although legislator ideology is not significant, party is extremely 
important, with Democrats being over 60 percent more likely to vote in favor of 
minimum wage bills than Republicans. Economic incidence is also insignificant using my 
general dataset; notably, however, incidence is negative suggesting that a large 
proportion of minimum wage workers in a district makes a legislator less likely to vote 
for the bill. When I restrict my data to Type 1 votes or look at the variation within parties, 
however, I find that incidence matters more than was initially apparent, but it remains 
negative in all three restrictions.  
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This might be due to the influence of special interests of employers who are 
located in these districts and who may be made worse off by such a bill, or it could be 
due to the perception that high minimum wages lead to greater unemployment. Future 
research ought to examine this question more fully, possibly by looking at special interest 
contributions. To do so, one could add onto the dataset from this thesis with the campaign 
contributions data from the relevant industries, namely those that pay a large contingent 
of their employees the minimum wage such as fast food, retail, warehouses, etc. 
Additionally, one could further investigate how the public perceives the unemployment 
effect of minimum wages. Even if minimum wages likely do not result in massive 
unemployment (Card and Kreuger 1994), if the public thinks that it will, they could 
further pressure representatives to vote against the minimum wage.  
My results suggest a complex story for why legislators vote in favor of minimum 
wage bills, one that is not entirely consistent with the MVT. Although legislators do 
appear to respond to somewhat the economic incidence of their district on a bill-by-bill 
basis, legislators actually move in the opposite direction of my hypothesis and are less 
likely to vote for a minimum wage bill as incidence gets bigger. However, this is far 
outweighed by the effect of party, which is consistently significant and has large effects 
on legislator decision making.  
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Appendix 
 
 
State Bill Number Year
Min Wage at 
Vote
Highest 
Proposed 
Change
Tiered
Implemented 
Over Time
Adjusted for 
Inflation
Arizona HCR2014 2016 $6.75 $9.50 0 1 1
California SB3 2016 $9 $15 1 1 0
California AB10 2013 8 $15 0 1 0
Connecticut S32 2014 8.7 $10.10 0 1 0
Connecticut H5291 2012 8.25 $8.75 0 1 0
Connecticut S387 2013 8.25 $9 0 1 0
Delaware SB6 2014 7.75 $8.75 0 0 1
Illinois SB11 2015 8.25 $11 0 1 0
Kentucky HB2 2015 7.25 $10.10 0 1 0
Kentucky HB1 2014 7.25 $10.10 0 1 0
Maine H 75 2015 7.5 $8 0 0 0
Maine H430 2014 7.5 $9 0 1 1
Maryland HB187 2014 7.25 $10.10 0 1 0
Maryland HB295 2014 7.25 $10.10 0 1 0
Massachusetts S2123 2014 8 $11 0 1 1
Massachusetts SB1925 2013 8 $11 0 1 0
Michigan SB934 2014 8.15 $9.25 0 1 1
Minnesota HF843 2015 9 $9.50 1 1 1
Minnesota HF1027 2015 9 $9.50 1 1 1
Minnesota HF92 2014 8 $9.50 1 1 1
Minnesota HF2091 2014 8 $9.50 1 1 1
New Hampshire HB1403 2014 7.25 $9 0 1 1
New Hampshire HB501 2013 7.25 8.25 0 0 0
New Jersey AB 15 2016 8.38 $10.10 0 0 1
New Jersey AB2162 2012 7.25 $8.50 0 0 1
New Mexico SJR13 2014 7.5 11.93 0 1 1
New Mexico S416 2013 7.5 $8.50 0 0 0
New York A7257 2015 8 $15 1 0 1
New York A9148 2012 7.25 $8.30 0 0 1
New York A38 2013 7.25 $9 0 0 1
North Dakota H1414 2013 7.25 10.22 0 1 1
Oregon S1532 2016 9.75 $13.50 1 1 1
Rhode Island SB194 2015 9 $10.10 0 0 0
Rhode Island HB5074 2015 9 $9.60 0 0 0
Rhode Island SB256 2013 7.75 $8.25 0 0 1
Rhode Island SB2249 2014 8 $9 0 0 0
Rhode Island HB5079 2013 7.75 $8.25 0 0 1
Rhode Island HB7194 2014 8 $9 0 0 0
Rhode Island H7396 2012 7.4 $7.75 0 0 0
Rhode Island S2374 2012 7.4 $7.75 0 0 0
Virginia S590 2014 7.25 $9.25 0 0 0
Washington H1355 2015 9.47 $12 0 1 1
Table A1: Bills with Minimum Wage Increases Between 2012-2016, Content
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State Bill Number Year
Concurrence 
Vote
Veto Override 
Vote
Signed by 
Governor
Vote in Senate Vote in House
Arizona HCR2014 2016 1 0 0 20-9 32-28
California SB3 2016 1 0 1 23-15 48-26
California AB10 2013 0 0 1 26-11 45-27
Connecticut S32 2014 0 0 1 21-14 87-54
Connecticut H5291 2012 0 0 0 N/A 88-62
Connecticut S387 2013 0 0 1 21-15 89-53
Delaware SB6 2014 1 0 1 12-9 27-14
Illinois SB11 2015 0 0 0 35-18 N/A
Kentucky HB2 2015 0 0 0 N/A 60-31
Kentucky HB1 2014 0 0 0 N/A 54-44
Maine H 75 2015 0 0 0 18-17 81-66
Maine H430 2014 0 1 0 19-16 86-58
Maryland HB187 2014 0 0 0 N/A 87-48
Maryland HB295 2014 1 0 1 34-13 89-46
Massachusetts S2123 2014 0 0 0 32-6 N/A
Massachusetts SB1925 2013 0 0 1 32-7 N/A
Michigan SB934 2014 1 0 1 24-15 76-34
Minnesota HF843 2015 0 0 0 N/A 73-56
Minnesota HF1027 2015 0 0 0 N/A 78-55
Minnesota HF92 2014 0 0 0 39-28 68-62
Minnesota HF2091 2014 0 0 1 35-31 131-0
New 
Hampshire
HB1403 2014 0 0 0 N/A 173-118
New 
Hampshire
HB501 2013 0 0 0 N/A 200-133
New Jersey AB 15 2016 0 0 0 21-18 42-31
New Jersey AB2162 2012 1 0 0 23-16 45-33
New Mexico SJR13 2014 0 0 0 37-32 25-17
New Mexico S416 2013 0 0 0 25-17 37-32
New York A7257 2015 0 0 0 N/A 97-43
New York A9148 2012 0 0 0 N/A 97-43
New York A38 2013 0 0 0 N/A 102-44
North Dakota H1414 2013 0 0 0 N/A 24-70
Oregon S1532 2016 0 0 1 16-12 32-26
Rhode Island SB194 2015 0 0 1 34-3 59-13
Rhode Island HB5074 2015 0 0 1 35-3 59-13
Rhode Island SB256 2013 0 0 1 31-6 65-6
Rhode Island SB2249 2014 0 0 1 31-5 58-11
Rhode Island HB5079 2013 0 0 1 31-4 64-7
Rhode Island HB7194 2014 0 0 1 32-5 63-10
Rhode Island H7396 2012 0 0 1 24-11 62-8
Rhode Island S2374 2012 0 0 0 26-11 63-8
Virginia S590 2014 0 0 0 20-20 N/A
Washington H1355 2015 0 0 0 N/A 51-44
Table A2: Bills with Minimum Wage Increases Between 2012-2016, Votes
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Table A4. Merged Districts by State, 5 Year ACS 
Bill Number No Merge Merge Total 
A38 21 129 150 
A7257 21 128 149 
A9148 26 124 150 
AB 15 35 88 123 
AB10 8 187 195 
AB2162 58 146 204 
H1355 11 85 96 
H1414 74 20 94 
H430 279 58 337 
H5291 100 51 151 
H7396 75 30 105 
H75 148 38 186 
HB187 66 74 140 
HB295 45 284 329 
HB5074 68 44 112 
HB5079 65 42 107 
HB7194 77 35 112 
HCR2014 17 133 150 
HF1027 73 60 133 
HF2091 0 262 262 
HF843 0 129 129 
HF92 0 130 130 
S1532 38 51 89 
S2374 79 30 109 
S32 92 87 179 
S387 98 88 186 
S416 57 54 111 
S590 9 32 41 
SB11 3 58 61 
SB194 68 44 112 
SB2249 75 34 109 
SB256 71 42 113 
SB3 9 150 159 
SB6 41 42 83 
SB934 40 147 187 
SJR13 17 25 42 
Total 1,964.00 3,161.00 5,125.00 
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